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Abstract
In this study, we reconsider the optimal non-linear tax problem with the public goods
from the perspective of the commitment issue and examine how it affects the condition of
the public goods provision. We show that the Samuelson rule should be modified when the
government cannot commit and the skill types of taxpayers are revealed. Even if taxpayers
have the same preference, which is separable and additive with respect to consumption and
leisure, the Samuelson rule breaks down. Our analysis focuses on the effect of commitment
issue on the marginal cost of public funds and the level of public goods provision. Our
findings imply that the level of investment in public goods may be excessive in comparison
to the case where the commitment issue is not considered.
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1 Introduction
An important role in the public sector is to manage several kinds of services; for instance,
providing health care, police protection, or education. In order to examine the optimal level
of these activities, many researchers analyze the provision of public goods. As a first-best
optimum, the public goods should satisfy the condition that the sum of the marginal utility
for those who benefit from the goods is equal to the marginal cost. This is known as the
Samuelson rule. Boadway and Keen (1993) consider another situation; that is, when the
government cannot observe the marginal productivity of taxpayers and it is assumed that
the public goods are financed by non-linear income taxation. They found that if the utility
function of taxpayers is of the weakly separable form, then the Samuelson rule should be
applied in the second-best environment.
Although they use the static model, public goods have the property of durable goods.
Therefore, a dynamic setting is necessary. The traditional dynamic Samuelson rule implies
that the marginal social benefit of public goods should be equal to the marginal cost plus
the static Pigou effect1 and the dynamic efficiency effect. The extension leads to topics that
we need to include in our analysis. Batina (1990) considered a time inconsistency. If the
government can use public debt policy and maintain the optimal expansion path, that is, the
government can commit to its expenditure policy in the future, then the dynamic efficiency
effect disappears. He pointed out that such a preliminary finding is unrealistic and showed that
if the government cannot control its allocation over all periods, then the dynamic efficiency
effect may decrease the Pigou effect. As for the non-linear income tax model, Aronsson
and Grandlund (2011) focused on the situation where consumers have a time inconsistent
preference for public goods. Assuming a paternalistic government, they showed that the
social optimal condition of public goods provision should deviate from the Samuelson rule.
This paper differs from these related studies as it focuses on the commitment issue. Pre-
vious studies assume full commitment by the government. Then, once taxpayers reveal their
productivities, the government can reconsider its tax policy in the next period on the basis of
information gained from the previous period. However, anticipating this action by the gov-
ernment, taxpayers adjust their decision making in the first period. This is also known as the
ratchet effect. Although previous studies of the optimal tax problem without commitment are
discussed in the literature: for instance, Roberts (1984), Apps and Rees (2006), Bisin and
Rampini (2006), Brett and Weymark (2008), Krause (2009), Guo and Krause (2011, 2013),
and Berliant and Ledyard (2014), no previous studies examined how the commitment issue
affects the provision of public goods. In this study, we utilize two periods and the partial
equilibrium version of the model discussed in Pirttila¨ and Tuomala (2001). We show that
even if the utility function is satisfied by the condition of separability, then the Samuelson
rule should not be applied when considering the commitment issue. Moreover, we analyze
1Pigou (1928) pointed out that when the public good is financed by the distortionary tax, the social marginal
cost of public goods is relatively higher than financed by the non-distortionary tax. This is because the dead
weight loss is generated by distortionary taxes. The effect is called “Pigou effect.”
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how the commitment issue affects the marginal cost of public funds (hereafter MCPF).
The study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and considers the bench-
mark case. Section 3 analyzes the time-consistent public goods provision. As an additional
analysis, we examine how the commitment issue affects the level of public goods provision
and social welfare in the economy. Thereafter, we provide a numerical example in Section 4.
Conclusion is given in Section 5. Proofs of our main results are presented in the Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Environment
Herein, we introduce a model with two time period denoted by t = 1, 22 and a production
technology with constant returns to scale in terms of labor and capital, where wage rates and
rates of return correspond to productivity. For simplicity, the interest rate is assumed to be
unity. The economy consists of consumers who have two kinds of productivity, θH and θL,
where θH > θL. A consumer who has a productivity θH is called a high-type agent, while
another agent is called a low-type agent. For simplicity, it is assumed that the number of each
type of consumer is unity3 and their productivities are constant over time. Heterogeneity of
productivity between consumers means that income differentials exist among consumers. In
order to redistribute consumer incomes, the government designs a tax policy and a program
for the provision of public goods. However, the government cannot observe the productivity
of consumers. The purpose of the government is to achieve an allocation that maximizes
the social welfare through a redistribution policy that offsets the incentive for consumers to
choose a mimicking strategy. The tax problem discussed in this paper can be regarded as a
direct mechanism, whereby consumers report their own productivities to the government. In
this situation, the revelation principle is applied in order to determine the optimal allocation.
We adopt the classical setting of the optimal tax theory proposed by Stiglitz (1982, 1987).
2.2 Consumers
Consumers choose the amount of labor supply and consumption in both periods, where the
consumption of type i agent in period t is defined as cit and the labor supply of type i agent
in period t is defined as lit. Then, the labor income is yit ≡ θilit. Since consumers live in a
two-periods economy, they can only save in the first period. The amount of savings by the
type i agent can be denoted by si. As with the production technology, the savings technology
2Even if we extend this model to an economy with n periods, the result does not change. But, under the
infinite-period model, the complete pooling case introduced in Section 3 cannot be defined. We therefore
consider the two-period model, for simplicity.
3The same result remains in an environment where there is a continuum of consumers. However, we ought
to take into account the partial-pooling case discussed by Apps and Rees (2006) and Krause (2009). Even if this
case is included in our analysis, the result does not change.
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is linear in terms of the amount of savings. Consumers choose these variables in order to
maximize their utility. It is assumed that all consumers have the same preference with respect
to consumption, the pubic goods, and the labor supply. Moreover, it is also assumed that
the preference for consumption and the pubic goods is additive and separable for the labor
supply.4 Then, the utility function can be given by
Ui(ci1,G1, l
i
1, c
i
2,G2, l
i
2) =
∑
t
βt−1{u(cit,Gt) − v(lit)} (1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor. The sub-utility function u(·) is strictly increasing and a
concave function, and v(·) is strictly increasing and a convex function.
2.3 The government
The purpose of the government is to implement an allocation that maximizes the social wel-
fare through its redistributive policy. Herein, the social welfare function is defined as the sum
of consumer payoffs. It is assumed that the government cannot observe individual consumer
productivity θi, while the amount of labor income and savings are assumed to be observable.
This allows the government to levy non-linear taxes on these variables. The tax revenue is
divided between the public goods provision and savings by the government, which is de-
noted by sG. As for the public goods, it has the property of durable goods. Then, it evolves
according to the following difference equation:
G2 = δG1 + g2 (2)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation factor and g2 is the amount of investment in public
goods in period 2. For simplicity, public goods contribute to the welfare of consumers but
not to the production sector. However, the government can save when consumers use the
same technology. As a result of this saving, the government compensates for the lack of
redistribution between the first and second periods. Thus, the budget constraint in each period
can be formulated as follows:∑
i
yi1 −
∑
i
ci1 − (
∑
i
si + sG) − pG1 ≥ 0 (3)∑
i
yi2 + (
∑
i
si + sG) −
∑
i
ci2 − pg2 ≥ 0 (4)
where p is the marginal cost of investment in the public goods. In sum, the government
collects tax revenues through labor and capital income taxes, and uses these taxes to provide
public goods and incur saving in accordance with its redistribution policy.
4In Boadway and Keen (1993), they found that the Samuelson rule is applied in the second-best environment
if the utility function is ui(v(cit,Gt), lit), which is weakly separable. The utility function in this paper is a more
restrictive formulation. It is natural that their result remains the same when the utility function is assumed to be
that shown in equation (1). The details are discussed in our benchmark analysis.
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2.4 Benchmark analysis
In order to examine the effect of commitment, we first consider the case where we assume
full commitment by the government. Under this assumption, the government can control
the allocation in both periods through its tax policy in the beginning of period 1, and all
consumers believe that the commitment by the government is credible. Then, the government
chooses cH1 , y
H
1 , c
L
1 , y
L
1 , s
H, sL, sG, G1, cH2 , y
H
2 , c
L
2 , y
L
2 and g2, which maximizes∑
t
βt−1
∑
i
{u(cit,Gt) − v(
yit
θi
)} (5)
subject to equation (2), (3), (4), and∑
t
βt−1{u(cHt ,Gt) − v(
yHt
θH
)} ≥
∑
t
βt−1{u(cLt ,Gt) − v(
yLt
θH
)} (6)
Equation (5) is a utilitarian social welfare function, which is the objective function of the gov-
ernment. Equation (6) is the incentive compatibility constraint for a high-type agent. It means
that the government faces the constraint that induces a high-type agent to choose his/her own
labor supply and consumption, rather than the labor supply and consumption assigned to a
low-type agent. Suppose that uict is the marginal utility with respect to consumption in period
t for a type i agent and uiGt is the marginal utility with respect to the public good in the period
t for a type i agent. In this case, the social optimal condition with respect to the public good
is given by:
∑
i
MRS iG1,ci1
+ δβ
∑
i
MRS iG2,ci2
= p (7)
where MRS i
Gt ,cit
≡ uiGtuict is the marginal rate of substitution of the public good for private con-
sumption for a type i agent in period t. Equation (7) implies that the Samuelson rule should
be applied; that is, the social marginal benefit of increasing a unit of the public good over the
two periods should be equal to the producer prices of the public goods related to the aggre-
gate amount of private goods. This is because the utility function is of the separable form and
all agents have the same preference; this assumption means that agents evaluate the marginal
benefit in the same manner. In other words, the relation between the agent’s evaluations is
ˆMRSGt ,cLt = MRS
L
Gt ,cLt
(8)
where the superscript hat denotes the choice by a high-type agent who chooses a mimicking
strategy. For a high-type agent, the marginal benefit of choosing the truth-telling strategy is
equal to that of choosing the mimicking strategy. When equation (8) holds, an increase in the
level of the public goods never affects the incentive compatibility constraint. Moreover, in the
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benchmark case, the rule for the social optimal allocation should be constant over periods,
since the government can commit to the second-period policy in the first period. Therefore,
the government does not need to deviate from the Samuelson rule in both periods. 5
3 The time consistent public goods rule
In the beginning of the second period, the government can try to exploit the efficiency gain
in the second period by using information gathered in the first period. This implies that the
optimal tax problem with multiple-periods involves time inconsistency. Being aware of this
relation, agents (in particular, a high-type agent) also adjust their own decision-making in the
first period. This is known as a commitment issue. When the assumption of full commitment
is relaxed, we can consider two cases with respect to how to adjust agent behavior. These
cases are candidates for solving the non-commitment case and they called the complete pool-
ing case and complete separation case. 6 Consumers adjusting their behavior affects both tax
revenues and provision of public goods because the tax revenues finance the public goods.
The main purpose of this section is to examine how the commitment issue affects the optimal
condition of public goods provision.
3.1 The complete pooling case
Herein, a high-type agent decreases his/her own labor supply in order to benefit from the
information rent that he/she receives in the second period. Consequently, the government
cannot observe which agent is a high-type agent at the beginning of the second period. This
means that the tax contract assigned in the first period does not depend on the type of agents:
(c¯1, y¯1, s¯). In the second period, given as v¯ = (G¯1, s¯, sG), the government chooses cH2 , yH2 , cL2 ,
yL2 , and g2 , which maximizes ∑
i
{u(ci2,G2) − v(
yi2
θi
)} (9)
subjet to the budget constraint in the second period that corresponds to equation (4) and
u(cH2 ,G2) − v(
yH2
θH
) ≥ u(cL2 ,G2) − v(
yL2
θH
) (10)
Equation (9) is the social welfare function in the second period and equation (10) is the
incentive compatibility constraint in the same period. On the basis of the results in the second
5It is a rule issue; that is, the government should follow the Samuelson rule in the second-best environment,
is obtained in the first-best environment. Therefore, the amount of public goods in the second-best environment
is not necessarily equal to the level of public goods in the first-best environment.
6Which case is the solution to the non-commitment case depends on the shape of the function and the range
of the exogenous variables. The details are analyzed using numerical examples in Section 4.
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period, the government chooses c¯1, y¯1, s¯, sG, and G¯1, in order to maximize∑
i
{u(c¯1, G¯1) − v( y¯1
θi
)} + βVPool2 (v¯) (11)
subject to ∑
i
{y¯1 − c¯1 − s¯} − sG ≥ pG¯1 (12)
where VPool2 (v¯) is the value function in the second period.
Herein, it is easy to show that the dynamic formulation of the Samuelson rule in the
benchmark case should be applied as the social optimal condition of the public goods provi-
sion in the complete pooling case. In the first period, the incentive compatibility constraints
are binding for both type agents. Therefore, the government faces no incentive compati-
bility constraints. In the second period, the planning problem corresponds to the standard
non-linear income tax problem. In terms of the evaluation of public goods between a high-
type agent and a low-type agent, the outcome in this period conforms with the benchmark
case. Therefore, the social optimal condition of public goods provision in the benchmark
case remains the same as that in the complete pooling case.
3.2 The complete separation case
We consider the case in which the tax system separates a high-type agent from a low-type
agent in the first period; that is, the asymmetric information can be resolved in the second
period. At an optimum, the government can utilize the lump-sum tax policy in order to
redistribute income between agents. We turn to the planning problem in this case. Given as
v = (G1, sH, sL, sG), the government chooses cH2 , cL2 , yH2 , yL2 , and g2, in order to maximize∑
i
{u(ci2,G2) − v(
yi2
θi
)} (13)
subject to equation (4). Let VSep2 (v) be the value function in the second period of the complete
separation case. With this in mind, the government chooses cH1 , c
L
1 , y
H
1 , y
L
1 , andG1 to maximize∑
i
{u(ci1,G1) − v(
yi1
θi
)} + βVSep2 (v) (14)
subject to equation (3) and
u(cH1 ,G1) − v(
yH1
θH
) + β{u(cH2 (v),G2(v)) − v(
yH2 (v)
θH
)}
≥ u(cL1 ,G1) − v(
yL1
θH
) + β{u(cL2(v),G2(v)) − v(
yL2(v)
θH
)} (15)
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where cH2 (v) and yH2 (v) are the first-best contracts for a high type agent, and cL2(v) and yL2(v)
are the first-best contracts for a low-type agent. Equation (15) is the incentive compatibility
constraint for a high-type agents. The left-hand side is the utility for a high-type agent that
chooses the truth-telling strategy and the right-hand side is the utility received when he/she
chooses the mimicking strategy; that is, the second period payoff received by a high-type
agent in the complete pooling case. Suppose that φ is the Lagrange multiplier for the incentive
compatibility constraint, λt is the Lagrange multiplier for the resource constraint in period t,
and vˆy2 is the marginal dis-utility with respect to labor income in period 2 for an agent who
mimics. Combining these factors with the optimal conditions allows us to obtain the social
optimal condition with respect to the public good:
[
∑
i
MRS iG1,ci1
+ δβ
λ2
λ1
∑
i
MRS iG2,ci2
] + ΨG = p (16)
where
ΨG ≡ φ
λ1
[{uHG2 − uLG2}{δ +
dg2
dG1
}︸!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!︷︷!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!︸
The direct effect
+ {uHc2
dcH2
dG1
− vHy2
dyH2
dG1
} − {uLc
dcL2
dG1
− vˆy dy
L
2
dG1
}︸!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!︷︷!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!︸
The indirect effect
]
The derivation of equation (16) is presented in Appendix A. This equation contains two ad-
ditional effects.
Firstly, it relates to the durability of public goods. Since the government takes into ac-
count the outcome in the second period and public goods have the property of durable goods,
increasing a unit of the public goods in the first period influences the incentive compatibility
constraint. The effect is represented by ΨG, and is named “the durable effect.” Furthermore,
we can classify this effect into two terms; the direct effect and indirect effect. The first term,
ΨG, indicates the direct effect. Since the public goods provision contributes to the welfare
of agents, an additional public goods provision directly affects payoffs both agents, the agent
who chooses the true-telling strategy and the agent who chooses the mimicking strategy. The
indirect effect appears since the endogenous variables chosen in the second period depend on
the public good provision in the first period. This also affects the incentive compatibility con-
straint. These are illustrated within the second and third brackets of ΨG. A critical question
is whether the direct effect exceeds or falls the indirect effect. To see the difference between
these effects, suppose that the preference is additive and separable between private consump-
tion and the public good. Under this assumption, the direct effect disappears because the
marginal utility of the public good between agents is identical. In contrast, the indirect effect
is negative, as shown in Appendix B. The sign of the indirect effect implies that an incremen-
tal unit of the public good restricts the incentive compatibility constraint. Specifically, the
additional public good provision decreases the payoff of agent who chooses the truth-telling
strategy, but increases the payoff of agent who chooses the mimicking strategy.
The second novel effect is a consequence of production inefficiency. The engine of this
effect is the ratio of the shadow price of public fund across time periods. The first-order
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condition with respect to the government’s saving reveals the following:
−λ1 +ΨsG + βλ2 = 0
where
ΨsG ≡ βφ[{uHG2 − uLG2}{δ +
dg2
dsG
} + {uHc2
dcH2
dsG
− vHy2
dyH2
dsG
} − {uLc
dcL2
dsG
− vˆy dy
L
2
dsG
}]
The variable ΨsG indicates how an additional saving by the government affects the incentive
compatibility constraint. When the disutility function of effort is iso-elastic, the sign of ΨsG
is negative. The proof is shown in Appendix C. The negative sign implies that the production
efficiency theorem by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) breaks down, since the marginal social
value of public funds is not equal to the marginal rate of transformation of commodities
between the first and second periods. Therefore, as the shadow price of pubic funds is higher
in the second period than that in the first period, the discount rate of the social marginal
benefit is greater than unity. Hereinafter, we call this effect “the public saving effect” and this
feature allow us to propose the following.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the government cannot commit to the second period tax policy.
When all agents are completely separate in the first period (even if the preference satisfies
the separability condition and is constant for all agents), then the dynamic formulation of the
Samuelson rule should be modified.
It is more interesting for us to examine the interaction with MCPF. Rearranging equation
(16) yields the following:
S MB1 + ΨG︸︷︷︸
the durable effect
+ (
βλ2
βλ2 + ΨsG
− 1)δ
∑
i
MRS iG2,ci2︸!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!︷︷!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!︸
the public saving effect
= p
where S MB1 ≡ ∑i MRS iG1,ci1 + δ∑i MRS iG2,ci2 is the social marginal benefit of an increase in
the level of public goods in the first period. As ΨG is negative, the durable effect means that
MCPF is greater than unity. To begin with, an increase in a unit of the public goods provision
requires additional tax revenues. Then, if the government utilizes distortionary taxes, MCPF
is greater than unity because of the Pigou effect. In contrast, an additional public goods
provision affects MCPF through the demand for taxed goods. The durable effect is different
from this response, because increasing a unit of the public goods provision influences the
welfare level through the incentive compatibility constraint. As for the public saving effect, it
implies that MCPF is less than unity because ΨsG < 0. As λ1 is greater than zero, the sign of
this term is positive. The weight for the marginal rate of the substitution of public goods for
private consumption in the second period is higher than that in the first period. This means it
has the opposite effect on MCPF compared with the durable effect. Therefore, if the durable
effect dominates the public saving effect at the social optimum, then MCPF is greater than
unity and vice versa.
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4 Numerical examples
Herein, we provide numerical examples in order to answer the following questions:, (i) Which
case of social welfare is greater, the complete separation case or the complete pooling case;
and (ii) How different is the social optimal public goods provision through the social optimal
condition with respect to the pubic goods discussed in the previous sections?
4.1 Specification and Parameterization
It is assumed that utility function is represented by the the constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) function that is satisfied by separability,∑
t
βt−1{ 1
1 − σ (c
i
t ·Gi)1−σ − (
yit
θi
)γ} (17)
where σ and γ are non-negative. It is also assumed that σ = 1.0 and γ = 2.0. The other
preference parameter (a discount factor) is β = 0.38, the wage rate of a high-type agent is
θH = 2.0, and θL is equal to unity. Concerning a setting of the public goods, the marginal
cost of investment in the public goods is unity and the depreciation factor is 0.5. 7 Table 1
summarizes the results of our simulation.
4.2 The level of social welfare
The level of social welfare in each case is shown in the last line of Table 1. The highest
level of social welfare can be achieved in the benchmark case. This outcome corresponds
to previous studies by Bisin and Rampini (2006) and Guo and Krause (2013). The com-
plete separation case is ranked second and the complete pooling case is ranked third. The
asymmetric information remains in the second period of the complete pooling case, while it
resolves in the complete separation case. The difference of information structures between
the two cases can enhance the social welfare level in the complete separation case.
4.3 The level of public goods provisions
In order to analyze the level of public goods determined by the social optimal condition
discussed in the previous sections, we focus on the value of public goods provided in the first
period. In fact, the level of public goods is highest in the benchmark case and, lowest in the
complete pooling case. Since the Samuelson rule should be applied in the benchmark and
7This specification and parameterization, as outlined below, refer to Golosov et al. (2006) and Guo and
Krause (2013). Their simulations are based on the optimal non-linear income tax problem without the public
goods provision. They examine the two-period case and the infinite-horizon case. In the former case, the level
of social welfare in the complete separation case is larger than that in the complete pooling case; the same result
as we find in this paper.
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Table 1: Results of simulation
Benchmark case Pooling case Separation case
High Low High Low High Low
ci1 0.893466 0.443849 0.590996 0.590996 1.01529 0.2694
yi1 1.88829 1.20472 1.99574 1.99574 1.88046 1.39809
si 0.553725 0.104287 0.533473 0.533473 0.0397036 0.105052
ci2 0.948375 0.787473 1.62404 1.26582 0.970125 0.970125
yi2 1.65153 1.02771 1.69052 1.21287 1.66288 1.36307
Payoff -0.846492 -0.945162 -1.53149 -2.13712 -0.836572 -1.90097
G1 1.97365 1.31917 1.54457
g2 0.725424 1.50384 1.53499
sG -0.875972 0.423365 0.304534
S MB1 1.00 1.00 1.25221
λ2
λ1
1.00 1.00 1.69018
ΨG - - -1.51776
Social welfare -1.79164 -3.66859 -2.73754
complete pooling cases, the difference in the public goods levels between the cases depends
on the values of the endogenous variables. On the other hand, the level of public goods in the
complete separation case is ranked second. A key variable to discuss the difference between
the benchmark case and the complete separation case is ΨG. Since the value of this variable
in the complete separation case is negative, the sum of the marginal rates of substitution
should be greater than the producer price of the public good in terms of the private good. By
comparing the Samuelson rule in this case with the benchmark case, we find that the level of
public goods in the complete separation case is lower than in the benchmark case.
5 Conclusion
In this study, we reconsider the optimal non-linear tax problem with the public goods provi-
sion from the perspective of the commitment issue. If taxpayers have the same preferences
and the preferences are separable consumption and leisure, the Samuelson rule does not need
to be modified, as discussed in previous studies: Christiansen (1981) and Boadway and Keen
(1993). However, the outcome is altered dramatically when the commitment issue is consid-
ered. We show that the Samuelson rule should be modified when the taxpayers are completely
separated by tax policy, even if the utility function satisfies the separability condition. More-
over, we point out through numerical examples that the effects of the commitment issue also
affect the level of public goods.
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Appendices
A. Proof of equation (16)
Consider the second-period planning problem in the complete separation case. The La-
grangian can be written as follows:
L2 =
∑
i
{u(ci2, δG1 + g2) − v(
yi2
θi
)} + λ2[
∑
i
{yi2 + si − ci2} + sG − pg2] (18)
The first order conditions are
∂L2
∂cH2
= uHc2 − λ2 = 0 (19)
∂L2
∂cL2
= uLc2 − λ2 = 0 (20)
∂L2
∂yH2
= −vHy2 + λ2 = 0 (21)
∂L2
∂yL2
= −vLy2 + λ2 = 0 (22)
∂L2
∂g2
=
∑
i
uiG2 − λ2p = 0 (23)
∂L2
∂λ2
=
∑
i
{yi2 + si − ci2} + sG − pg2 = 0 (24)
where the notations on derivatives are denoted by uict =
∂u
∂cit
(cit,Gt), viyt =
dv
dlit
1
θi
and uiGt =
∂u
∂Gt
(cit,Gt). From the envelope theorem, we find
dVSep2
dG1
= δ
∑
i
uiG2 (25)
dVSep2
dsG
= λ2 (26)
Next, we turn to the first period planning problem. The Lagrangian in the first period is
L1 =
∑
i
{u(ci1,G1) − v(
yi1
θi
)} + βVSep2 (v) + λ1[
∑
i
{yi1 − ci1 − si} − sG − pG1] (27)
+φ[u(cH1 ,G1) − v(
yH1
θH
) + β{u(cH2 (v),G2(v)) − v(
yH2 (v)
θH
)}
−u(cL1 ,G1) + v(
yL1
θH
) − β{u(cL2(v),G2(v)) − v(
yL2(v)
θH
)}]
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The optimality conditions with respect to the private consumption of each consumer, the
public goods and saving are as follows:
∂L1
∂cH1
= (1 + φ)uHc2 − λ1 = 0 (28)
∂L1
∂cL1
= (1 − φ)uLc2 − λ1 = 0 (29)
∂L
∂G1
=
∑
i
uiG + β
dVSep2
dG1
− λ1p (30)
+βφ[{uHc2
dcH2
dG1
− vHy2
dyH2
dG1
+ uHG2
dG2
dG1
} − {uLc
dcL2
dG1
− vˆy dy
L
2
dG1
+ uLG
dG2
dG1
}] = 0
∂L1
∂sG
= β
dVsep2
dsG
− λ1 (31)
+βφ[{uHc2
dcH2
dsG
− vHy2
dyH2
dsG
+ uHG2
dG2
dsG
} − {uLc
dcL2
dsG
− vˆy dy
L
2
dsG
+ uLG
dG2
dsG
}] = 0
By the definition of public goods between the first period and the second period (equation
(2)), it is easy to show that the marginal effect of public goods in the first period on in the
second period is dG2dG1 = δ+
dg2
dG1
. Using equations (19), (20), (24), (26), (28), and (29), equation
(30) can be simplified to equation (16). !
B. Proof of the sign of ΨG
We consider the sign of ΨG. It is assumed that ∂
2u
∂c∂G is zero. Let A be the Hessian with
respect to equation (19) to (24). We can rewrite these equations as a matrix formation,
A
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
dcH2
dcL2
dyH2
dyL2
dg2
dλ2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
=
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0
0
0
0
δ
∑
i uig,g
0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
dG1
where
A ≡
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
uHc,c 0 0 0 0 −1
0 uLc,c 0 0 0 −1
0 0 −vHy,y 0 0 1
0 0 0 −vLy,y 0 1
0 0 0 0
∑
i uig,g −p
−1 −1 1 1 −p 0
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
The determinant of A is
|A| = −uHc,cuLc,cvHy,yvLy,yp2 +
∑
i! j
uic,cu
j
c,cv
i
y,y
∑
i
uig,g −
∑
i! j
uic,cv
i
y,yv
j
y,y
∑
i
uig,g < 0 (32)
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It implies that the inverse matrix of |A| exist and Cramer’s theorem is available. Then, we
obtain
dcH2
dG1
=
δ
∑
i uig,g
|A| pu
L
c,cv
H
y,yv
L
y,y < 0 (33)
dyH2
dG1
=
δ
∑
i uig,g
|A| pu
H
c,cu
L
c,cv
L
y,y > 0 (34)
dcL2
dG1
= −δ
∑
i uig,g
|A| pu
H
c,cv
H
y,yv
L
y,y > 0 (35)
dyL2
dG1
= −δ
∑
i uig,g
|A| pu
H
c,cu
L
c,cv
H
y,y < 0 (36)
dg2
dG1
=
δ
∑
i uig,g
|A| v
H
y,y{uHc,cuLc,c − uHc,cvLy,y − uLc,cvLy,y} > 0 (37)
These equations imply that ΨG is negative.
C. Proof of the sign of ΨsG
We show that ΨsG is negative. Suppose that the dis-utility is an iso-elastic utility function
of work effort, that is, v( y
i
t
θi
) = κν (
yit
θi
)ν, κ > 0, ν ≥ 1. We can rewrite equations (19) to (24) as a
matrix formation,
A
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
dcH2
dcL2
dyH2
dyL2
dg2
dλ2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
=
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0
0
0
0
0
1
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
dsG
Applicaition of Cramer’s rule yields,
dcH2
dsG
=
∑
i uig,g
|A| u
L
c,cv
H
y,yv
L
y,y < 0 (38)
dyH2
dsG
=
∑
i uig,g
|A| u
H
c,cu
L
c,cv
L
y,y > 0 (39)
dcL2
dsG
=
∑
i uig,g
|A| u
H
c,cu
H
c,cv
L
y,y < 0 (40)
dyH2
dsG
=
∑
i uig,g
|A| u
H
c,cu
L
c,cv
H
y,y > 0 (41)
dg2
dsG
=
1
|A|u
H
c,cu
L
c,cv
H
y,yv
L
y,yp < 0 (42)
– 13 –
From equations (19) and (20), it is easy to show that uHc2 is equal to u
L
c2 . Moreover, it implies
that cH2 is also equal to c
L
2 , if
∂2u
∂c∂G = 0. Then, we can find that
∂cH2
∂sG
− ∂cL2∂sG is zero. These results
give the following equation:
ΨsG = (
1
θH
)
1
|A|u
H
c,cu
L
c,c
∑
i
uig,g[
vˆyvHy,y(θL)2
vHy vLy,y(θH)2
− 1] (43)
Since the dis-utility function is iso-elastic, equation (41) can be rewritten as
ΨsG = (
1
θH
)
1
|A|u
H
c,cu
L
c,c
∑
i
uig,g[(
yL2
yH2
)(
θL
θH
)ν − 1] (44)
By subtracting equation (21) from equation (22), we find that yH2 > y
L
2 . Then, equation (42)
has a negative sign and ΨsG is also negative. !
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